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Fine-grained semantics for attitude reports*
Harvey Lederman
Abstract I observe that the “concept-generator” theory of Percus and Sauerland (2003), Anand
(2006), and Charlow and Sharvit (2014) does not predict an intuitive true interpretation of the
sentence “Plato did not believe that Hesperus was Phosphorus”. In response, I present a simple
theory of attitude reports which employs a fine-grained semantics for names, according to
which names which intuitively name the same thing may have distinct compositional semantic
values. This simple theory solves the problem with the concept-generator theory, but, as I go on
to show, it has problems of its own. I present three examples which the concept-generator theory
can accommodate, but the simple fine-grained theory cannot. These examples motivate the full
theory of the paper, which combines the basic ideas behind the concept-generator theory with
a fine-grained semantics for names. The examples themselves are of interest independently
of my theory: two of them constrain the original concept-generator theory more tightly than
previously discussed examples had.
Keywords: attitude reports, Frege’s puzzle, names, impossible worlds, concept-generators
1 Introduction
Let Millianism be the thesis that names which intuitively name the same thing have the same
compositional semantic value. Since “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” both intuitively name the
planet Venus, Millians say that these names have the same compositional semantic value.
Accordingly, they also say that the two sentences
1. Plato believed Hesperus was visible in the evening; and
2. Plato believed Phosphorus was visible in the evening
have the same compositional semantic value. This consequence of Millianism has been a
key source of resistance to the theory. If Plato nightly pointed to Venus and said (the Greek
* Thanks to audiences at Philosophical Linguistics and Linguistical Philosophy (PhLiP) 5, the Princeton Talks
in Epistemology and Metaphysics, and the NYU Semantics Group for their questions, to Chris Barker, Seth
Cable, Mike Caie, Daniel Hoek, Wes Holliday, Sarah Moss, Paolo Santorio and Yael Sharvit for conversations
and correspondence, and to Kevin Dorst, Ben Holguín, Matt Mandelkern, Daniel Rothschild, three anonymous
referees, and Josh Dever in his role as editor for comments on the paper. I’m especially grateful to Kyle Blumberg
and Cian Dorr, each of whom read two lengthy drafts and gave insightful detailed comments on both of them.
I’ve learned a a great deal about these issues from my joint work with Jeremy Goodman, and the paper is heavily
indebted to the many conversations we have had about them.
I have cut two substantial appendices and some footnotes from the published version of the paper. These
appendices and notes are not necessary for understanding the paper, but they may be of interest to some specialists,









translation of) “Hesperus is visible now, but Phosphorus never is”, many judge that 1 would
be true, while 2 would be false.1
But Millians too can respect this pattern of judgments, provided they hold that attitude
reports are context-sensitive in the right way (Schiffer (1979), Crimmins and Perry (1989);
see also Crimmins (1992), Dorr (2014), Goodman and Lederman (forthcoming)). Millians
may hold that in the right circumstances, uttering 1 naturally suggests a context in which both
1 and 2 are true, while uttering 2 naturally suggests a different context, in which both 1 and
2 are false. The two sentences are true in exactly the same contexts – and “Hesperus” and
“Phosphorus” have the same compositional semantic value – but typical uses of 1 in such
circumstances are true in the contexts they suggest, while typical uses of 2 are false in the
different contexts they suggest.
As it stands, this idea is more of a wish-list than a theory. How should we think about these
different contexts in which 1 and 2 are supposedly interpreted? The most prominent Millian
theory of attitude reports in semantics today, first published by Percus and Sauerland (2003),
and developed by Anand (2006) and Charlow and Sharvit (2014), can be seen as implementing
a natural answer to this question. Very roughly, on this theory, context supplies a set of salient
descriptions of each object, and 1 and 2 are true in exactly the contexts where one of the
contextually salient descriptions for Venus, δ , is such that pPlato believed δ is visible in the
eveningq is true. The idea is then that using the word “Hesperus” often suggests a context
where “the planet visible in the evening” is a salient description of Venus, while using the
word “Phosphorus” often suggests a context where this description is not salient (but “the
planet visible in the morning” is).
This theory offers a simple and intuitive account of the contrast between 1 and 2. But, as I
will argue, it is not sufficiently flexible to handle closely related examples. Suppose again that
Plato nightly pointed to Venus and said “Hesperus is visible now but Phosphorus never is” and
consider:
3. Plato did not know that Hesperus is Phosphorus;
4. Plato was not sure that Hesperus is Phosphorus;
5. Plato did not believe that Hesperus is Phosporus.
These sentences, as Frege (1892) observed, are naturally interpreted as true in this scenario.
But, as I show in section 2, a straightforward application of the theory of Percus and Sauerland
(2003) predicts that none of them has an intuitive true reading.
One response to this argument – and one I consider near the end of the paper, in section 8 –
would be to develop a different Millian theory – perhaps a variant of the theory of Percus and
Sauerland (2003) – which avoids this prediction. Here, however, I first explore a more radical
response. Millianism drives the need for a contextualist account of the contrast between 1 and
2, and it is one of the assumptions which leads to the problem with 3-5. It is therefore natural to
wonder whether we might have been better off rejecting Millianism from the start. Motivated
1 Some take a passage in Laws 821c, where the character Kleinias describes the paths of “Hesperus and Phosphorus










by this line of thought, I develop a semantics for attitude reports based on a fine-grained
theory of the semantics of names, according to which names which intuitively name the same
thing may nevertheless have different compositional semantic values.2 In Section 3 I present
an abstract model for a fine-grained theory, and illustrate how it allows for reasonable true
interpretations of 3-5. In section 4, building on ideas from Kaplan (1986) and Aloni (2005), I
show how the theory can be extended to handle generalized quantifiers.
So far, it might seem, so good. But the basic fine-grained theory has some new problems
of its own. In section 5 I present three examples which this basic theory cannot handle, but
which the theory of Percus and Sauerland (2003) handles smoothly. These examples motivate
a new theory which combines the key ideas behind Percus and Sauerland’s theory with a
fine-grained semantics for names. Section 6 presents such a theory, and section 7 shows how
the new theory accounts for the examples. In that section, I discuss systematically how my
examples each impose independent constraints on the shape of my theory, and how they go
beyond examples in the literature (in particular those discussed in Anand (2006)) designed to
motivate particular features of the concept-generator theory (most notably, its use of existential
quantification over concept-generators).
With the new theory before us, we face an important question: should we prefer this
new fine-grained theory, or a more conservative, Millian variant on the theory of Percus and
Sauerland (2003)? In section 8 I present a Millian theory which is sufficiently flexible to
handle 3-5, as well as the examples from section 5. But I argue that the fine-grained semantics
should be preferred over this alternative.3
2 A problem for the concept-generator theory
In this section I present the concept-generator theory (which I will refer to as CG-theory),
which was first published in Percus and Sauerland (2003) (building on notes of Irene Heim),
and argue that it fails to predict relevant true readings of 3-5.4
2 Given my definitions, a theory of the semantics of names is fine-grained if and only if it is not Millian. Many
theories of names are naturally seen as fine-grained according to these definitions. “Being called” predicativist
theories, whether “that-” predicativist (Burge (1973)) or “the-” predicativist (Larson and Segal (1995), Elbourne
(2005), Matushansky (2008), Fara (2015)), as well as descriptivist accounts of the kind often associated with
Frege (1892) and Russell (1905)) are often intended as fine-grained theories. Non-descriptivist variants on the
ideas of Frege (1892) may also be fine-grained theries, since they predict that when “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus”
are embedded in attitude reports, they will not have the same compositional semantic value (because they will
have different referents). And it is natural to see “variabilist” theories (Dever (1998: §2.3), Cumming (2008),
Pickel (2015), Schoubye (forthcoming)) as falling in this class as well, since even though two differently-indexed
variables may have the same value relative to one assignment, relative to a different assignment function they
may not.
3 I will assume throughout the paper that any satisfactory theory must accommodate intuitive true readings of
3-5, and related sentences. But I am in fact open to the idea that this assumption is false, and that the best
overall theory may predict that these sentences do not have true readings at all (see Goodman and Lederman
(forthcoming: §11)). The paper can thus be read as exploring what follows from this assumption, while leaving it
open that broader theoretical considerations could lead us ultimately to reject it.
4 While writing Goodman and Lederman (forthcoming: §9), Jeremy Goodman and I recognized a version of this











The CG-theory aims to allow that, for instance, “Plato believes Hesperus is bright” is true
in a context (roughly) if and only if there is a contextually salient definite description δ such
that pPlato believes δ is brightq is true in that context. A main goal of the theory is to predict
these truth-conditions without requiring that the name “Hesperus” (implausibly) undergoes
syntactic movement out of the clausal complement of “believe”. The formal background for
the theory is that of standard possible-worlds semantics for attitude verbs in the tradition
of Hintikka (1962): we take as given a non-empty set of worlds W , a set of individuals X ,
and a function DOX : X → (W 9 P(W )) (9 indicating that the function may be partial)
which delivers for each individual x and each world w where x has beliefs, the set of worlds
that are consistent with x’s beliefs at w. The theory goes beyond this standard framework in
its use of concept-generators, functions from individuals to individual concepts, where an
individual concept is in turn a function from worlds to individuals. In particular, we assume
that when a name or pronoun occurs within the scope of an attitude verb, a covert pronoun
which denotes a concept-generator takes the name or pronoun as its argument; the result
of applying this concept-generator to its argument (which denotes an individual) will be an
individual concept (the type of the denotation of definite descriptions). To produce existential
quantification over such definite descriptions (as in the target truth-conditions), we assume
that concept-generator variables themselves are bound below some relevant attitude verb,
and that the attitude verb introduces existential quantification over concept-generators. By
varying which concept-generator operates on a given name or pronoun, we indirectly vary
which individual concept (denotation of a definite description) is associated with the individual
denoted by the name or pronoun. We can thus produce the desired truth-conditions without
requiring undesirable syntactic movement.
The assumption that covert concept-generator variables can be bound beneath attitude
verbs forces a modification to the usual lexical entries for attitude verbs themselves. A verb like
“believe” will no longer always have a function from worlds to truth-values as its argument. If
there is a concept-generator pronoun bound beneath the verb, its argument will denote instead
a function from concept-generators to functions from worlds to truth-values. If there are more
concept-generator pronouns bound there, then the argument will be more complicated still. To
handle this variation in the type of the argument of “believe”, we use the following lexical
entry instead of a more standard one:
CG-Believes JbelievesKg, f = λ p.λx.λw. either for all w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), p(w′) = 1, or for
some n > 1, there are G1, ...,Gn ∈ f (x) which are salient for x and such that for all
w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), p(G1)...(Gn)(w′) = 1.5
We assume that context determines a function f , which maps each individual x to a set of
concept-generators, intuitively, those which are contextually salient relative to the individual
x. In this entry, and throughout, I associate function application to the left, so p(G1)(G2)(w) is
properly ((p(G1))(G2))(w). The first disjunct of the lexical entry (“either...”) covers the case
5 Strictly speaking, this clause only governs the case where DOX(x)(w) is defined; for the case where it is
undefined, we assume that the entry returns 0 regardless of the complement. This issue won’t be important for
the remainder of the section, so I won’t mention it again, but subsequent lexical entries for attitude verbs should









where there is no abstraction over concept-generators below “believe”, so that the complement
of “believe” is simply a function from worlds to truth-values. The second (“or...”) covers the
more interesting cases mentioned above, where p may be a function from concept-generators
to functions from concept-generators...to functions from worlds to truth-values. The entry in
effect introduces a sequence of existential quantifiers over concept-generators, of the exact
length needed to saturate the first argument of “believes”, so that it yields a function from
worlds to truth-values.
I now show in detail that this theory cannot produce a reasonable interpretation of 5. Given
the syntactic assumptions sketched above, the theory predicts that the following is the natural









Given the lexical entry for “believe”, the denotation of the VP of 5 with the above syntax
will be:
6. λx.λw. there are concept generators G1 and G2 which are salient relative to x such that
for all w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), G1(Hesperus)(w′) = G2(Phosphorus)(w′).
This property will be satisfied by any x and w whatsoever, provided there is a single concept-
generator G∗ that is salient for x. For by instantiating the existential quantifiers over concept-
generators G1 and G2 in 6 with G∗ we obtain:
7. λx.λw for all w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), G∗(Hesperus)(w′) = G∗(Phosphorus)(w′).
Since Hesperus=Phosphorus, for any world w′, G∗(Hesperus)(w′) = G∗(Phosphorus)(w′).
And since this holds for all worlds w′, it follows that for any x and any w, it will hold for all
6 Throughout the paper I assume an extensional treatment of modality, in which covert world-pronouns occur in
the syntax of sentences, and abstraction over world-pronouns is used to produce propositions (functions from
worlds to truth-values) when required (see e.g. Percus (2000)). I will use the simplest, highly unconstrained,
version of this theory, and in working examples, will simply cherry-pick my preferred syntax from the huge
array of available ones. I note, though, that everything I do below is compatible with the more constrained (and
to my mind preferable) system of Schwarz (2012), where the only constituents which take world-pronouns are
determiners. My basic theory could also be developed using quite different approaches to the “de re”/“de dicto”










w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w). So the VP will be satisfied by any individual and any world in any context
where some concept-generators are salient relative to that that individual.
These very weak satisfaction conditions for the VP give very demanding satisfaction
conditions for the negated VP, and thus for the sentence as a whole: on this theory, 5 will
be true only in contexts in which no concept-generators are salient relative to Plato (and
similar points apply to 3 and 4). But contexts of this kind yield bizarre readings of attitude
ascriptions. In such a context, “Plato did not believe Athens was a city”, and “Plato did not
believe Socrates was a philosopher”, would be true, as would variants with “did not know” or
“was not sure” in place of “did not believe”. Since the CG-theory predicts that 3-5 are true
only in such contexts, it fails to allow for the intuitive true readings that these sentences seem
to have: readings on which they describe Plato’s specific ignorance or lack of opinion about a
particular astronomical fact.7
In working this example, I assumed that the copula “is” can express the relation of identity.
But the argument does not depend essentially on this assumption. I could have run it with the
following sentences instead:
8. Plato did not believe that Hesperus shares its center of mass with Phosphorus.
9. Plato did not believe that Hesperus has matter in common with Phosphorus.
10. Plato did not believe that Hesperus is coextensive with Phosphorus.
On the natural assumption that relative to every relevant way of thinking about Venus, Plato
believed that the planet shares its center of mass with itself, believed that it has matter in
common with itself, and believed that it is coextensive with itself, the CG-theory would predict
that none of these sentences have the intuitive true readings they seem to have. In the rest of
the paper, I will continue to discuss the problem I’ve developed here in terms of the examples
3-5. The main reason for this is that my own theory will involve a non-standard treatment of
identity, which is highlighted by the way it handles these examples. But the reader who is
(rightly) concerned about the behavior of the copula when it occurs in the scope of attitude
verbs may understand my references to these sentences as references to 8-10 instead; my
formal treatments of sentences featuring identity can be extended straightforwardly to these
sentences as well.
There is a tradition, often associated with Quine (1956) and Kaplan (1968), of distin-
guishing between “de re” and “de dicto” readings of reports like 5. In light of this tradition,
one might see 3-5 not as posing a problem for Percus and Sauerland’s theory, but instead as
showing that their theory of the de re readings of such reports must be supplemented with a
7 Allowing one of the names to take a world argument which is bound outside the scope of “believe”, while the
other is bound underneath “believe”, would allow a somewhat intuitive true reading of our sentence. But this
approach does not generalize to closely related sentences, which would also naturally be taken to be true against
the right background, for instance, “Plato did not believe that Hesperus was Phosphorus, Phosphorus was Venus,
or Hesperus was Venus”. Thanks to Josh Dever here.
Note that for the kind of sentences I’ve considered in this section, Santorio (2014) is simply a different
implementation of the same truth-conditions as the CG-theory, and so is subject to the same problem. Like the









further theory of the de dicto readings of them.8 But this response solves one problem only by
creating a new, different one. For the traditional distinction between de re and de dicto readings
of sentences like 5 is not in good standing. There is strong evidence for such a distinction
between readings of ascriptions which feature overt definite descriptions or quantifiers. It is
easy to feel a difference between two ways of understanding sentences like “Plato thought
the star which rises in the evening did not rise in the evening” or “Plato thought every planet
was not a planet”. More importantly (since such semantic phenomenology is not probative),
the same kind of ambiguity is evident in sentences where definites and quantifiers interact
with modal and temporal operators (e,g. “it could have been that the stars which rise in the
evening did not rise in the evening”, “in ancient times, the star which rises in the evening did
not rise in the evening”). But there is no similar felt change of perspective between readings of
5, and, crucially, referential uses of names do not exhibit such an ambiguity when they interact
with modal or temporal operators. More generally, I am not aware of any direct evidence that
sentences like 5 exhibit this ambiguity (for some further discussion see e.g. Cumming (2016)).
So if this argument shows that Percus and Sauerland’s theory must distinguish de re and de
dicto readings of such sentences, it is still an argument against that theory: it shows that the
theory requires postulating an ambiguity for which there is no direct evidence. The theory I
will develop below will not require such an ambiguity.
The argument of this section narrowly targets what I have called the “CG-theory”, that
is, the main theory found in Percus and Sauerland (2003), Anand (2006) and Charlow and
Sharvit (2014). It does not apply to all Millian theories, or even all Millian theories which use
the machinery of concept-generators.In section 8 I will consider the prospects for a Millian
theory which escapes this argument.9 But first – and for most of the paper – I will explore a
different response, which sees the argument as casting doubt on the underlying Millianism of
the CG-theory, and thus takes it to motivate developing a fine-grained, non-Millian alternative.
3 A basic fine-grained semantics
In this section I present a simple model of a fine-grained theory, which allows a reasonable
true reading of 5.
In presenting my model, I’ll re-use some notation from my less formal presentation of the
CG-theory; from now on the notation should be taken to have the meanings I give it here. Our
basic class of models has the following ingredients:
• W , a non-empty set, thought of as the set of worlds;
• De, a set;
8 Indeed, in correspondence Percus and Sauerland have said that their theory should be supplemented in this way;
see also Sauerland (2015: p. 77).
9 I focus in this paper on variations on the CG-theory, but there are other Millian theories which predict a true
reading of “Plato did not know that Hesperus is Hesperus” (and of 4 and 5 as well). Cable (2018) is one such
approach; others are Crimmins and Perry (1989), Crimmins (1992) and the theories described in Goodman and










• DOX : De→ (W 9P(W )), a function which, for each element of De, returns a partial
function which maps each world where the individual corresponding to that element of
De has beliefs to a nonempty set of “doxastically possible” worlds for that individual
at that world;
• R⊆W ×W , an equivalence relation on W , thought of as representing relative possi-
bility, as used in the semantics for the modal “it’s necessary that”;
• E : W →P(De×De) a function from worlds to equivalence relations on De, used to
give the semantics for the “is” of identity, and such that if wRw′, then E(w) = E(w′).
For readability in what follows, I will often subscript world-arguments, so for example, I will
write Ew for E(w). I will use 2 for the set of truth values {0,1} and Dp for the set of functions
from worlds to truth values, i.e. 2W . I sometimes call these “propositions”.10
Two aspects of this model will be unfamiliar. First, in not requiring R to be the universal
relation on W , we allow W to contain some worlds which are intuitively “impossible” relative
to others. Second, the “is” of identity is interpreted not by model-theoretic identity, but by
possibly non-trivial equivalence relations Ew on De, which can also vary across impossible
worlds. The elements of De are thus not to be thought of as individuals; instead we should think
of individuals as standing in a natural bijection with equivalence classes under E@ (where
“@” here and throughout stands for the actual world). I will sometimes say that individuals
“are represented by” or “correspond to” such equivalence classes. By this I mean no more than
that there is this natural bijection between individuals and these equivalence classes.
I’ll return to these aspects of the model theory in a moment, but first, let’s see how the
semantics allows us to deliver a reasonable trivial true reading of 5. Consider the following
toy model from our class of models, in which De = {h, p, pl}, W = {@, i}, R is the identity
relation on W , E@ is the smallest equivalence relation which relates h and p, Ei is model-
theoretic identity on De, and finally for all w ∈W , DOX(pl)(w) = {i}. Here and throughout,
I will use @ to denote the actual world. Here then is a simple fragment interpreted on this
model, with a flatfooted entry for “believe” that I will revise later on (the entries here are all
insensitive to the assignment function g):
• JHesperusKg = λw.h,
• JPhosphorusKg = λw.p,
• JPlatoKg = λw.pl
• JisKg = λw.λx.λy.xEwy;
• Jit’s not the case thatKg = λw.λx ∈ 2.1− x..
10 For simplicity in the formal treatments in the paper I won’t consider variability across times; I will pretend that
the only dimension of variability for these relations is world-variability. I also won’t consider issues connected to










Believe (Preliminary) JbelieveKg = λw.λ p.λx.∀w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w) p(w′) = 111
We can now give a straightforward treatment of 5. The set DOX(pl)(@) = {i}, and it
is not the case that hEi p. So “Plato does not believe Hesperus is Phosphorus” is true at all
worlds in our model (as is “Plato believes Hesperus is not Phosphorus”). More generally, in
any model in which the set DOX(pl)(@) contains any (impossible) worlds w such that ¬hEw p
then“Plato does not believe Hesperus is Phosphorus” will be true. Relative to our toy model,
not only 5 is true, but so are other attitude reports, such as “Plato believes that Hesperus was
Hesperus” and “Plato believes Hesperus is not Phosphorus”. Unlike the CG-theory, then, the
present theory allows for a true reading of 5 without appealing to a reading of “believe” on
which Plato does not believe (basically) anything at all.
This simple, abstract model thus allows us to make reasonable predictions about 5. I will
sometimes speak of it as a “semantics”. By this I mean that it is a formal model used to
make predictions both about the truth and falsity of sentences in context and about entailment
relations among sentences (Yalcin (2018)). I do not mean that the model gives a “semantics”
in some heavier-weight philosophers’ sense of that term. It is just a model, to be judged by its
simplicity, tractability and predictive strength. In all three of these dimension, my models are
comparable to possible-worlds models. Most importantly, just as in standard possible-worlds
models, at every world in every model I consider, Boolean connectives such as “it’s not the
case that” will behave standardly. As a result propositions themselves will form a Boolean
algebra under the usual set-theoretic operations.12 The only non-standard feature of the models
will be that identity is interpreted by a non-trivial equivalence relation on De, an equivalence
relation which can vary from world to world. This small deviation from the assumptions in
possible worlds semantics is precisely what allows us to deliver a reasonable true reading of 5.
In line with my commitment to viewing the model theory abstractly, I will be officially
neutral throughout on how to understand elements of De. But to give the reader a feel for what
these elements could be, I will occasionally speak heuristically of “ways of thinking about”
individuals. For the most part this locution is meant as a synonym for “element of De”, though
at times it may bear a little more weight in motivating a particular way of developing the
theory.
11 Again, technically, this only governs the case where DOX(x)(w) is defined; the sentence should be taken to be
false regardless of its complement if DOX(x)(w) is undefined. But this issue won’t matter at all below, so I won’t
mention it again.
12 This way of using impossible worlds thus avoids some standard arguments against the utility of more deviant
impossible worlds (see Bjerring (2013), and Bjerring and Schwarz (2017)).
I will furthermore require that at all worlds, possible or impossible, identity is a congruence with respect
to the denotation of intuitively extensional predicates. For example, I will assume that at every world w, the
semantic value of “is bright” applied to w and x ∈De is 1 if and only if for every y such that xEwy, the denotation
of “is bright” applied to w and y is 1. This constraint means that for intuitively extensional predicates F , we will











In this section I consider how to extend the fine-grained theory from the previous section to
sentences featuring quantifiers.
Consider first the following example:
Context Mercury and Venus are the only interior planets (i.e. planets closer to the sun than
earth). Suppose that Venus is visible in the evening, but that Mercury is not.
11. At least two interior planets are visible in the evening.
This sentence should be false: there is only one interior planet, Venus, which is visible in the
evening. But our semantics will not obviously deliver this result, since there are two elements
of De, the semantic value of “Hesperus”, and the semantic value of “Phosphorus”, which
satisfy the predicate “is visible in the evening”.13
The basic problem is clear: we do not want “at least two” to count elements of De, but
instead to count individuals, which correspond to equivalence classes of elements of De under
Ew. A simple way of solving the problem – and the one I will adopt here – is to assume a
mandatory and stringent form of domain restriction, on which the only admissible domains
for the quantifier at a world draw exactly one element from each (relevant) equivalence class
at that world. This element of De then acts as a “surrogate” or “proxy” for the equivalence
class to which it belongs; we can count equivalence classes (and thus individuals) by counting
their surrogates.14
Formally, a function S : W →P(De) is a surrogate domain restriction if and only if for
every w ∈W and every X ∈ Iw there is exactly one x ∈ X in S(w). (Recall that Iw is the set
of equivalence classes of De under Ew.) We assume that context supplies a surrogate domain
restriction S, and then use the following lexical entry for the quantifier “at least two”:
13 This problem with 11 arises for fine-grained theories like mine on which the semantic values of intuitively
extensional predicates like “is an interior planet” are functions from worlds to functions from the domain of
the semantic values of names to truth-values.(It would also arise for theories on which such predicates denoted
functions from the semantic values of names to propositions; the key point is that, no matter where they occur,
intuitively extensional predicates denote functions which in some natural sense operate on the domain of the
semantic values of names.) An alternative style of fine-grained theory takes occurrences of intuitively extensional
predicates which are not in the scope of attitude verbs to denote functions not on the semantic values of names,
but on equivalence-classes of them. The most natural versions of such theories do not have any trouble with
11, but they face a related problem with sentences which involve binding into the scope of attitude verbs, like
“There are at least two interior planets which Plato thinks are visible in the evening”. To handle such examples,
these theories typically employ a non-standard rule for predicate abstraction (Bigelow (1978), Yalcin (2015),
Lederman (2020)). I am inclined to see such a change to the rule for abstraction as more disruptive than the
domain restrictions I will impose below to handle 11. But I will not give a systematic comparison between the
two approaches: I have simply wanted to observe that while 11 poses a problem for the style of fine-grained
theory I will be developing here, it does not pose a problem for all fine-grained theories.
14 To my knowledge, Kaplan (1986: p. 258-9) first gave the name “surrogatism” to a related proposal (see Section
XVI for development of the view). Aloni (2005) cf. Ninan (2018)) Dorr (2014) and Bacon and Russell (2017)










Jat least twoKg,S = λw.λF.λG. at least two x∈ Sw are such that F(x) = 1 and G(x) = 1.
The requirement that quantifiers be restricted by a surrogate domain restriction eliminates
the problem with 11. For any S, the proposition expressed by an utterance of that sentence
(assuming the most natural syntax) would be:
• λw. for at least two x ∈ S(w) x is an interior planet at w and visible in the evening at w.
Regardless of what surrogate restriction is chosen, this proposition will be false. For the
equivalence class corresponding to Mercury does not have an element which is visible in the
evening, and no equivalence class other than the ones corresponding to Mercury and Venus
have elements which are interior planets. Any element of the equivalence class corresponding
to Venus will be an interior planet at @ and also be visible in the evening at @, but there is
only one such entity in the domain of the quantifier. Since the proposition is true only if there
are at least two such entities in the domain of the quantifier, the proposition is false.15
Surrogatist domain restrictions are similar in important ways to Maria Aloni’s conceptual
covers (Aloni (2005)). In fact, there is a class of my models in which the conceptual covers
are simply a subclass of the surrogatist domain restrictions. One could see the remainder of
the paper as presenting problems for Aloni’s theory and showing one way the theory could be
extended to solve those problems. Indeed, for some readers, this may be a helpful perspective
on the project of the paper more generally: as arguing that the best overall theory of attitude
reports combines key elements of Aloni’s proposal with key elements of the CG-theory.16
I’ll call the proposal that all determiners are mandatorily restricted by surrogate domain
restrictions, while attitude verbs are given the simple semantics from section 3 Basic Sur-
rogatism. This proposal gives an account of a broad array of data without using anything
resembling concept-generators. In the next section I’ll present three problems for this theory
and go on to propose a refinement of it.
In Basic Surrogatism, the world-argument of a determiner has an important new role:
it controls which equivalence-classes stand as proxy for the domain of individuals for the
determiner (reflected in the fact that Sw is defined with respect to Iw, i.e. equivalence classes
with respect to the identity relation as interpreted at that world). We can motivate this feature
of the proposal (and see how it works in more detail) by considering two further examples:
15 Here I’ve used locutions like “x is an interior planet at w” as a shorthand for “the denotation of ‘is an interior
planet’ applied to w and then x is 1”, and I’ll continue to do this throughout. But the denotations of predicates
operate on elements of De, not on individuals (which stand in bijection not with elements of De but with
equivalence classes of them). So while I will say that such elements “are interior planets at w”, we should
remember that the relevant entities do not correspond to individuals but stand for the semantic values of names.
16 Throughout the paper I will assume that a surrogate domain restriction is supplied by context and can change
from context to context. But on some more concrete ways of viewing my model theory, a single surrogate domain
restriction may be singled out as distinguished, and it may be natural to see it as the restriction used in every
context. For instance, descriptivists who see elements of De as individual concepts might take the surrogate
domain restriction in every context to be the set of constant functions which return the same individual at every










Context Suppose Plato believed that earth was the planet closest to the sun, so that there
were no interior planets. Suppose furthermore that he believed that Hesperus and
Phosphorus were two distinct exterior planets, believed that they were bright, and
believed that Mercury was not bright.
12. Plato believed at least two exterior planets were bright.
13. Plato believed exactly one interior planet was bright.
Each of these sentences has a true reading in this context. The second may be easier to access
by considering the dialogue “Venus and Mercury are the interior planets, Plato believed that
Venus was bright and Plato did not believe that Mercury was bright. So Plato believed exactly
one interior planet was bright.”
The salient true reading of 12 results from an “opaque” or de dicto interpretation of “at least
two”, that is, an interpretation on which its world argument is bound below the attitude verb
“believed”. For instance, the relevant syntax might be represented as “λw. Plato-w believed-w
λw′. at least two-w′ exterior planets-w′ were bright w′.” Using Surrogatist Two, the sentence
on this regimentation would express the following proposition:
• λw. for all w′ ∈ DOX(Plato)(w) for at least two x ∈ S(w′) x is an exterior planet at w′
and x is bright at w′.
Since exactly one x is chosen from each equivalence class in Iw′ , (which correspond to the
individuals there would be if this world were the actual one), this proposition requires us
to count individuals at Plato’s belief-worlds. And the proposition will be true. For in this
scenario, it is clear that the denotations of “Phosphorus” and “Hesperus” occupy different
equivalence classes at Plato’s belief-worlds (Plato thinks they are distinct planets). Since these
elements of De satisfy the restrictor predicate (they are exterior planets) and the nuclear scope
predicate (they are bright) at Plato’s belief-worlds, every element of their equivalence classes
at those worlds must also satisfy both the restrictor and the nuclear scope property at those
worlds. (Recall that we are assuming that intuitively extensional predicates are congruences
with respect to Ew at every world w; see n. 12.) So, regardless of the choice of surrogate from
these equivalence classes, there will indeed be two distinct equivalence classes with elements
which satisfy these properties.17
The salient true reading of 13, by contrast, results from a “transparent” or de re interpreta-
tion of “exactly one”, that is, an interpretation on which its world argument (and the world
argument of “exterior planets”) is bound outside the scope of the attitude verb “believed”. For
instance, the relevant syntax might be represented as “λw. Plato-w believed-w λw′. exactly
one-w interior planet-w were bright w′.” Using the obvious Surrogatist entry for “exactly one”,
the sentence would express the following proposition
17 Barker (2016) develops a rich theory which is in some important ways related to mine. But, as Barker acknowl-
edges, his theory cannot produce opaque (i.e. de dicto) readings of quantifiers inside attitude reports, so he cannot









• λw. for all w′ ∈ DOX(Plato)(w) exactly one x ∈ S(w) is an interior planet at w and is
bright at w′.
Note here that the world arguments of S and of “interior planet” are bound by the highest-scope
binder over worlds, not by a binder under “believe”. As a result this proposition will also be
true. There are two Z ∈ I@ such that all of their elements are interior planets at @: the classes
corresponding to Venus on the one hand, and Mercury on the other. By assumption one and
only one of these classes has elements which are bright at w′ for all w′ ∈DOX(Plato)(@) (and
we may assume that all of the elements of this equivalence class, including the denotations
of “Hesperus” and of “Phosphorus” satisfy this condition). So, regardless of our choice of
surrogate for these equivalence classes, the proposition expressed will be true.18
Surrogate domain restrictions help us to solve the problem with 11. They also give rise
to a constrained way of determining which domain a quantifier ranges over, based on its
world-argument. This second feature allows us smoothly to account for varying domains
in iterated reports, as in the different readings of “John thinks Mary hopes two people are
coming for dinner”. Since the treatment of such iterated reports is straightforward, I won’t
describe it in detail. But since many fine-grained theories become very complex when they
attempt to handle such iterated reports, it is an important feature of the present account that
this generalization is so straightforward.19
18 It does not seem possible to separate the transparent/opaque interpretation of the restrictor of a determiner from
the choice of which domain is used in counting by a determiner, suggesting that the world-pronouns of these
two constituents should be coindexed. In my preferred setting, that of Schwarz (2012), only determiners take
world-arguments in the syntax, so the desirable requirement that the restrictor and the determiner are assessed at
the same world is imposed essentially automatically.
19 The system to this point (and also the final system of the paper) is naturally seen as predicting that the following
are false:
(i) There is an x and there is a y such that x is y but Plato did not know that x was y;
(ii) There is an x and there is a y such that x is y but Plato did not know that x was coextensive with y.
On the (desirable) assumption that the surrogate domain restriction is the same for each occurrence of “there is
a” in (i), that sentence will express the same proposition as “There’s an x such that Plato did not know that x was
x”, which has no intuitive true interpretation in my system, since every element of De bears Ew to itself at every
world. A similar point holds for (ii). There is thus an interesting difference between the way the system handles
distinct coreferring names (as in 3-5), and the way it handles distinct variables governed by quantifiers which are
assessed at the same world ((i) and (ii) are essentially the existential generalizations of 5 and 10, respectively).
Neither (i) nor (ii) is an English sentence, and I don’t know of convincing English examples that tell against
this prediction of my theory. The system does not make analogous predictions if distinct pronouns are simply
bound by an abstractor which is not in turn operated on by an overt quantifier (e.g. “John and Jim are such that
Mary didn’t know he was him”), or if two coreferential pronouns are used referentially in the complement clause
of an attitude report (e.g. “Mary didn’t know he was him”). The system also handles cases with coreferential
occurrences of demonstratives (“John doesn’t know that is that”, where the two demonstrations pick out the same
object) straightforwardly, by assigning the two occurrences of “that” different elements of De which are related
by E@ (for the example, see Perry (1977: p. 12-13)).
The theory to this point also predicts that the following are false
(iii) There’s an x and there’s a y such that x is y but Plato believed x wasn’t y;










5 Three Problems for Basic Surrogatism
In this section I present three problems for Basic Surrogatism, which the CG-theory avoids. In
the next section I respond to the problems by presenting a theory which combines some key
ideas from the CG-theory with the fine-grained semantics I’ve developed to this point.
As I discuss in more detail later, in section 7, the examples I will present go beyond
and sharpen examples which have previously been used to argue for various aspects of the
CG-theory (for instance, its use of existential quantification over concept-generators).
5.1 Beyond double vision
A first problem for Basic Surrogatism comes from the following example:
Context John has four pictures in front of him, two pictures each of two teachers. The teachers
are Anna and Beau; we think think of the photos of Anna as A1 and A2, and the photos
of Beau as B1 and B2. John thinks that the photos are of four distinct people. He points
at A1, A2 and B1 and says as he points to each of them “this person is Italian". He
then points at the last picture, B2, and says “this person is French”. As a matter of fact
teacher Anna is Italian and Beau is French.20
14. Someone John thinks is French is French.
15. ?Everyone John thinks is Italian is Italian.
16. Someone John thinks is Italian is French.
17. ?No one John thinks is French is French.
The sentences 14 and 16 are naturally heard as true, whereas the sentences 15 and 17 are
naturally heard as false. (They all have true, and false, readings in this scenario; my claim is
just that there is a contrast in immediate acceptability between these pairs.) But on the natural
assumption that the only relevant ways of thinking about individuals (i.e. elements of De)
correspond to the four pictures of the teachers, Basic Surrogatism predicts that 14 is true in a
context if and only if 15 is true in that context, and that 16 is true in a context if and only if 17
is true in that context. Moreover, it predicts that 14 is true in a context if and only if 17 is false
in that context.
So Basic Surrogatism cannot accommodate these data. But the CG-theory can. And, as I
will show below, a theory which adapts the key insights of the CG-theory to a fine-grained
setting can get the best of both worlds, accommodating these data, while also allowing a true
reading of 3-5.
But, as I will discuss in sections 7.3 and 8, my final theory will treat sentences with negation over the relevant
attitude verb (as in (i) and (ii)) quite differently from sentences with the negation inside the scope of the attitude
verb (as in (iii) and (iv)), and the final theory allows both (iii) and (iv) to be true.










When I return to discuss this example in more detail, in section 7.1, I will argue that it
motivates the use of existential quantification over concept-generators within the CG-theory
(and an analogous feature of my own theory). There, I will discuss in detail how the argument
based on this example complements and goes beyond some previous arguments for this feature
of the theory (in particular, one based on the “double vision” scenario of Quine (1956) and
those developed by Anand (2006)).
5.2 Problems with plural subjects
The following example, due to Cian Dorr, presents a different kind of problem for Basic
Surrogatism:21
Context (Based on Dorr, p.c.) Eve knows that the heavenly body she sees in the evening and
calls “Hesperus” is a planet and not a star, but she thinks that the heavenly body she
sees in the morning and calls “Phosphorus” is a star and not a planet. Dawn knows that
the heavenly body she sees in the morning and calls “Phosphorus” is a planet and not a
star, but she thinks the heavenly body she sees in the evening and calls “Hesperus” is
a star and not a planet. Neither has encountered this heavenly body in any other way
than via their evening and morning sightings. On Monday at noon, Eve learns that
Phosphorus is a planet, while Dawn learns that Hesperus is a planet, so
18. On Monday at noon, Eve and Dawn learned that Venus is not a star.
19. There’s a heavenly body which Eve and Dawn learned is not a star on Monday at noon.
These sentences have true readings in this scenario. But this fact poses a problem for Basic
Surrogatism. It is natural to think that if a person stands in the relation expressed by “learns”
in a context at a time t to a proposition p, then (i) the person did not stand in the relation
expressed by “knows” in that context to p in an interval between some t ′ earlier than t and
t, which is open at t, and (ii) the person does stand in the relation expressed by “knows” in
that context to p at t itself. The problem is that, to the extent that we have a grip on when
different names are assigned different element of De and how those elements compose with the
denotations of predicates, it is hard to see how there could be an element x of De that composes
with the denotation of “is not a star” (given the appropriate abstraction over world-pronouns)
to produce a proposition p such that (i) neither Eve nor Dawn stood in the relation expressed
by “knows” to p before Monday at noon, and (ii) both Eve and Dawn stood in the relation
expressed by “knows” to p on Monday at noon. For example, if there is a p ∈ De such that
every occurrence of “Phosphorus” in the vignette above expresses λw.p, and similarly an
h ∈ De (where h 6= p) such that every occurrence of “Hesperus” expresses λw.h, then s and c
will both fail (i): at all times on Monday morning, Eve knew that Hesperus was a planet and
not a star, and Dawn knew that Phosphorus was a planet and not a star.
Once again, although Basic Surrogatism cannot handle this example, I will show that, like
the CG-theory itself, a theory which adapts elements of the CG-theory to a fine-grained setting










can. Moreover, in section 7.2 I’ll show that the constraints imposed on the CG-theory by this
example are in an important sense independent of those imposed by 14-17.
5.3 The bound de re
A final problem for Basic Surrogatism comes from examples discussed by Soames (1989-90:
p. 198f.) (cf. Higginbotham (1991: p. 362 ex. 42) and, more extensively, Soames (1994)),
which have recently been brought back into the spotlight by Sharvit (2010) and Charlow and
Sharvit (2014):
Context John knows that Jupiter is bigger than Mars, and that Mars orbits the sun faster than
Jupiter. He believes no planet is bigger than Jupiter, and no two planets are exactly the
same size. He thinks that Hesperus is Jupiter and thinks that Phosphorus is Mars.
20. There’s something John thinks is Jupiter and is Mars.
21. There’s a planet which John thinks is as big as Jupiter and orbits the sun as fast as
Mars.
Intuitively these sentences are true. But Basic Surrogatism cannot predict this result. There
isn’t any way of thinking about Venus such that, relative to that way of thinking about it, John
thinks Venus is Jupiter and Venus is Mars. For John knows that Mars and Jupiter are distinct.
Similar points hold for 21.
Charlow and Sharvit (2014) show that the CG-theory naturally predicts true readings of
these examples. I’ll show below that a fine-grained theory which takes over ideas from the
CG-theory can handle them too. Moreover, in section 7.3 I’ll discuss how the constraints
imposed on the CG-theory by this example are in an important sense independent of those
imposed by the other examples in this section.
6 Fine-grained Semantics
Although the CG-theory makes incorrect predictions about 3-5, it smoothly handles all of the
data presented in the previous section. Basic Surrogatism smoothly handles 3-5, but it makes
incorrect predictions about all of the data in the previous section. In this section I show how
one can enrich Basic Surrogatism with ideas from the CG-theory to produce a theory which
handles both sets of data.
A bijection π : De→De is a permutation. A permutation π is w-admissible if and only if for
all x π(x)Ewx; for short I’ll call w-admissible permutations w-permutations. A w-permutation
can map different values within the same Ew equivalence class to different values, but it can
only map elements of an equivalence class to other elements of the same equivalence class.
For example, there are @-permutations which map the semantic value of “Hesperus” to the
semantic value of “Phosphorus”. But there are no @-permutations that map the semantic value
of “Hesperus” to the semantic value of “Mars”.22
22 There are no data I’m aware of that motivate using permutations rather than arbitrary functions from De to









By analogy to the CG-theory, I will assume that any occurrences of names or e-type
variables in the scope of attitude verbs are “wrapped” by variables denoting permutations,
which are obligatorily bound by an abstractor. To account for these new variables tπi , I assume
that the assignment function g is extended to be defined on new indices πi for all i > 0 and
that these indices are assigned permutations. Thus for instance, imitating the syntax of the









We assume that context supplies a function f which, for each person and world, returns a
set of permutations which are salient relative to that person and admissible at that world. If we
think heuristically of elements of De as “ways of thinking” about individuals, we can see this
f as induced by contextually supplied equivalence relations among ways of thinking about
individuals, which are defined relative to each person and world. In some contexts, speakers
take certain ways of thinking about objects to be equivalent relative to certain thinkers, while
others are not. For instance in some contexts the way of thinking about the planet Venus
associated with the name “Hesperus” is taken to be equivalent with the way of thinking
about Venus associated with the name “Phosphorus” relative to Plato and the actual world;
the conversational participants might be indifferent to how Plato thinks of the planet at the
actual world, and hence choose to disregard the difference between whether Plato believes
(for instance) the proposition typically expressed by “Hesperus is bright” or the proposition
typically expressed by “Phosphorus is bright”. But in other contexts, the relevant ways of
thinking about Venus may not be taken to be equivalent relative to Plato and the actual world;
the conversational participants do care about whether Plato thinks about Venus in one way as
opposed to another, and they do care about the difference in mental state between someone
who believes (for instance) the proposition typically expressed by “Hesperus is bright” as
opposed to the proposition typically expressed by “Phosphorus is bright”. Assuming that
context supplies such an equivalence relation among ways of thinking about things for each
person and world, this equivalence relation gives rise to a natural set of permutations for each
person and world, namely, the set of permutations which map every way of thinking to a way
of thinking that is contextually equivalent relative to that person and world. If we take this set
functions that are not permutations, it seems preferable to use the more restrictive notion (and readers have found










of permutations as the value of f relative to that person and world, then the first context above,
where differences between “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are unimportant relative to Plato and
the actual world, will be associated with an f such that f (Plato,@) contains a permutation
which maps the denotation of one to the other (and one which maps the denotation of the
other to the one). By contrast, the second contexts, where this difference is important, will be
associated with an f such that f (Plato,@) contains no permutation which maps one to the
other.23
Given this background, in the case of “believe” my proposal will be:
Believe JbelieveKg,S, f = λw.λ p.λx. either for all w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), p(w′) = 1, or for some
n > 1, and some π1 . . .πn ∈ f (x,w), ∀w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), p(π1) . . .(πn)(w′) = 1.
As above, the first disjunct (“either...”) covers the case where the relevant argument of “believe”
is just a proposition, while the second disjunct (“or...”) covers the more interesting case, where
p is a function from permutations to functions from permutations...to functions from worlds to
truth-values.24
If we assume that there are h, p∈De such that JHesperusKg,S, f = λw.h and JPhosphorusKg,S, f =
λw.p, then using this lexical entry (and after a series of simplifications), the displayed clause
computes to:
• λx. there are π1,π2 ∈ f (x,Js2Kg,S, f ) such that for all w∈DOX(x)(Js2Kg,S, f ), (π1h)Ew(π2 p).
This denotation of the VP is not trivially satisfied, as one can see by considering a context
where for all x and w, f (x,w) is the singleton set consisting of the identity function on De.
(This permutation is w-admissible for all w.) Under this assumption the clause will reduce to
• λx. for all w ∈ DOX(x)(Js2Kg,S, f ), hEw p,
which as we saw in section 3 is not trivially satisfied. The reader may readily verify that less
restrictive assumptions about f will also yield the result that the property expressed is not
trivially satisfied, so that 5 (as well as 3 and 4) will have reasonable true readings in a range of
contexts.
Given the assumption that when names occur inside attitude reports, permutation pronouns
take them as arguments, the exact semantic values of names within a given equivalence
class of E@ no longer have real significance: these values are simply place-holders. Provided
“Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” have distinct semantic values, our permutations can map them
23 The informal discussion using “contextual equivalence” makes it natural to impose further constraints on the
values of f (x,w) for every x and w. In particular, we should require that the set of permutations supplied for
any world and individual by f form a group: they should contain the identity permutation, and be closed under
composition and inverses. Moreover, they should satisfy the further constraint that if a permutation π is such that
for each a ∈ De there is a π ′ ∈ f (x,w) such that π(a) = π ′(a), then π ∈ f (x,w). For ease of exposition I won’t
discuss these constraints further in what follows, but I think of the official theory as imposing both of them.
24 The extra parameter w in f is needed to handle iterated attitude reports. When an attitude verb is embedded in
another intensional operator, the chosen permutations should be admissible relative to the worlds at which the










to (different) distinct values, and it is not important what the starting values are, so long as
they are distinct. Still, although formally there is nothing important about the exact values we
assign to names, it is natural to require that the identity function will always be an element of
f (x,w) for all x and w (as discussed in n. 23). If we make this assumption, then the choice of
semantic values for names does matter.
To produce a fully predictive theory, we need an account of how features of speakers’
psychology and surroundings make particular permutations and surrogates salient. In this
regard, my theory is on a par with the CG-theory: the CG-theory similarly stands in need of
an account of why particular concept-generators are salient in particular conversations. (The
notion of “acquaintance”, which proponents of the CG-theory typically appeal to, has yet to
receive a sufficiently substantive characterization to yield a predictive account.) How to fill
this lacuna is an urgent question both for my theory and for the CG-theory. But I will follow
proponents of the CG-theory in setting it aside for now. My hope is that, once we have a
model which makes reasonable predictions about truth, falsity and entailment among relevant
sentences, we will be in a better position to fill in this gap.25
25 One might wonder whether in a fine-grained setting, as opposed to a Millian one, we could use a lexical entry
which appeals to transformations of the whole embedded complement clause, and not just of the denotation of
names within it. More precisely, say that a proposition p′ is a w-variant of a proposition p if and only if for all
for all w′ such that wRw′, p(w′) = p′(w′), and consider:
Propositional Believe JbelieveKg,S, f = λw.λ p.λx. for some p′ ∈ f (x)(w)(p), ∀w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), p′(w′) = 1,
where f (x)(w)(p) is assumed to contain only w-variants of p; intuitively, w-variants of p which are salient
relative to x. This entry is essentially the lexical entry of Richard (1990), transposed to the present unstructured
setting. It can accommodate all of the data we have considered to this point, and has the signifiant advantage
of not requiring a complex syntax with permutation variables, allowing the arguments of attitude verbs to be
propositions.
The idea behind this simpler theory is attractive. But as it stands it is too unconstrained. Suppose that
if a person is female, they are necessarily female, and that John mistakenly believes that Queen Elizabeth is
male. Given these assumptions, the theory allows a true reading of “John believes 2+2 = 5”. For provided the
proposition that Queen Elizabeth is male is salient relative to John, that proposition would be a proposition which
is true at all the same possible worlds (i.e. none) that 2+2 = 5 is. This prediction seems absurd: a mistake about
Queen Elizabeth’s sex does not amount to a mistake about simple mathematics.
There is however a further, natural constraint which would eliminate this prediction, building on the notion
of “intensional isomorphisms” from Carnap (1947). We require not just that the elements of f (x)(w)(p) be
w-variants of p, but also that they be expressed by a (salient) sentence s which is w-intensionally epimorphic
in context to the complement clause s′. (Since this will be a pragmatic constraint on which propositions are
salient in context, imposing it does not require that any expression have the quotation-name of itself or another
expression as part of its semantic value.) Say that w′ and w′′ are w-intensionally equivalent if and only if wRw′
and w′ = w′′, that x,y ∈ De are w-intensionally equivalent if and only if xEwy, that n,m ∈ 2 are w-intensionally
equivalent if and only if n = m, and, finally, that f , f ′ ∈ DDστ are w-intensionally equivalent if and only if for
every w-intensionally equivalent a,b, f (a) is intensionally equivalent to f (b). Then a sentence (or more properly:
a syntactic parse of a sentence) s is w-intensionally epimorphic to a sentence s′ in a context if and only if there is
a surjection j from (not necessarily terminal) nodes of s to the terminal nodes of s′ such that (i) if j(α) dominates
j(β ) in s′ then α dominates β in s and such that (ii) for all α in the domain of j, the interpretation of α in this
context is w-intensionally equivalent to the interpretation of j(α) in this context. This proposal strikes me as
in some ways more attractive than the one in the main text, but I have focused on that one because it allows an










7 Solving the problems
In this section, I’ll describe how the new fine-grained theory solves the three problems I
described for Basic Surrogatism (sections 7.1-7.3). In each subsection I will also discuss in
more detail how my examples constrain the theory I’ve developed, as well as the CG-theory
itself. Readers primarily interested in the positive proposal of the paper may wish to skim or
even skip this section; a good deal of it is taken up with discussion of how alternative theories
fail to handle the three examples.
7.1 Beyond double vision
I suggested that on their most salient readings, 14 and 16 are true, while 15 and 17 are false.
I’ll now show how my theory accounts for this contrast.
In spelling out these predictions, I’ll call the equivalence classes corresponding to each
teacher A and B, and the elements of these classes corresponding to the four pictures, a1, a2,
b1, b2. I will assume that the relevant elements of A are exactly a1 and a2 and similarly that
the relevant elements of B are exactly b1 and b2. This assumption is very natural, given that we
have not supposed that John knows about these individuals in any way other than the pictures,
and this is all that is made salient about those individuals in our vignette. Finally, I will also
suppose that every @-permutation of the domain is salient relative to John at the actual world
(i.e. that f (John,@) is the set of all @-permutations). This assumption is not strictly required
to produce the results I’ll describe, but it is a natural one which gives rise to the contrast.
Relative to any choice of f and S, our lexical entry for “believe” predicts that on the most
natural syntax 14 expresses:
• λw. there is an x ∈ Sw such that for some π ∈ f (John,w), for all w′ ∈ DOX(John)(w),
π(x) is French at w′ and x is French at w.
Given our assumptions about f and the domain of quantification, this proposition will be true.
Regardless of the choice of surrogate of B (whether it is b1 or b2), there is an @-permutation
which maps this surrogate to b2, which is French at John’s belief-worlds. Regardless of the
choice of surrogate of B, that surrogate is French at @ (since every element of B is). So the
surrogate of B witnesses the existential “there is an x ∈ Sw”.
But under the same assumptions, we predict that 15 will be false. Relative to any S and f ,
our lexical entry for “believe” predicts that on the most natural syntax 15 expresses:
• λw. for every x ∈ Sw if some π ∈ f (John,w) is such that for all w′ ∈ DOX(John)(w),
π(x) is Italian at w′, then x is Italian at w.
Regardless of the choice of surrogate of B, there is an @-permutation which maps this
surrogate to b1. So the surrogate of B satisfies the antecedent of the conditional. But, again,
regardless of the choice of surrogate of B, that surrogate is French at @ (and hence not Italian
A quite different way of simplifying the lexical entries for attitude verbs, by complicating the lexical entry for










at @). So the surrogate of B is a counterexample to the universal “for every x ∈ Sw”, and the
proposition is false.
The reader may readily verify that 16 will similarly be predicted to be true, and 17 be
predicted to be false, under the same assumptions.
We can see how this example constrains the official theory by comparing it to an alter-
native. A functionalist theory assumes that the range of f consists only of singleton sets of
permutations (or, equivalently that the range of f is just the set of permutations, not the set of
sets of permutations). By contrast, existentialist theories allow that non-singleton sets may be
in the range of f . For example, here is a functionalist lexical entry for “believe”:
Functionalist Believe
JbelieveKg,S, f = λ p.λx.λw. ∀w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w′), p( f (x,w))(w′) = 1.26
In this entry I’ve assumed that the values of f are just permutations (not singleton sets of
permutations) and I’ve left out complications required to deal with cases where different
numbers of permutation variables are bound by the verb, since they won’t matter here.
Under the natural assumptions I made at the start of this section, a functionalist theory will
predict that 14 is true in a context if and only if 15 is, and that 16 is true in a context if and
only if 17 is. Given appropriate analogues of those natural assumptions, related theories which
use concept-generators in a Millian setting instead of permutations in a fine-grained one (let
f in the entry above supply a single concept-generator for each individual and world) make
exactly this same bad prediction. (Anand (2006: p. 25) calls this the “Skolemized” proposal,
but I will call “functionalist CG-theory”.) So functionalist theories of all stripes fail to predict
the observed contrast in immediate acceptability between these pairs of sentences.27
This new example complements and goes beyond some earlier arguments against func-
tionalist theories. Perhaps the most famous such argument, often attributed to Quine (1956),
starts from the following example:
Context Ralph sees Ortcutt by the docks. Ralph concludes on the basis of what he sees that
Ortcutt is a spy, Later, Ralph watches Ortcutt’s mayoral inauguration address on TV.
Ralph thinks that no mayor could possibly be a spy; the background checks are simply
too rigorous. So he concludes that Ortcutt the mayor is not a spy.
22. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
26 A nice feature of functionalist proposals is that if extended to modals they would preserve the duality of “must”
and “might”; if extended to modals my theory would fail to do this. Thanks to John Hawthorne here.
27 One might think that the different words “French” and “Italian” in the complement clauses of the reports above
on their own suggest different contexts for the relevant reports. But this feature of the examples is inessential.
If we substitute “is not Italian” for the relevant occurrences of “is French” in 14 and 17, and substitute “is not
French” for the relevant occurrences of “is Italian” in 15 and 16, the modified examples lead to the same pattern
of judgments of acceptability and unacceptability. The difference also can’t be attributed merely to the use of
the universal quantifier and negative universal rather than the existential, since “Every teacher John thinks is
French is French” is acceptable, while “Some teacher John thinks is French is Italian” is not. Extreme versions of
contextualism could escape these arguments by holding that context changes are cued by the minute differences
between these examples (e.g. by the use of the word “not” in the complement clause), but insisting on such










23. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
Both of these sentences are intuitively true in this scenario. But since there is no precise way
of thinking about Ortcutt relative to which Ralph both thinks that Ortcutt is a spy and thinks
that Ortcutt is not a spy, a functionalist fine-grained theory will predict that there is no context
where both are true.28 Similarly, since there is plausibly no relevant description δ which
refers to Ortcutt in the actual world and such that pRalph believes that δ is a spyq and pRalph
believes that δ is not a spyq are both true, the functionalist CG-theory also predicts that there
is no context where both of these sentences are true.
This example has played a central role in the development of semantic theories of attitude
reports. But the argument based on it is not particularly strong. For it relies on the claim that
the two sentences must be true in the same context. And this premise can be denied, without
giving up the far more important claim that both sentences are typically true when uttered.
As Anand (2006: p. 24-5) notes (citing Zimmerman (1991) and Heim (1998)), proponents
of the functionalist CG-theory (and, we might add, a fine-grained functionalist theory) may
claim that different concept-generators (respectively, permutations) are salient in the different
contexts in which these different sentences are typically assessed, and thus accommodate the
judgment that both are true when uttered, even though there is no single context in which both
are true.29
After describing precisely this limitation of arguments based on Quine’s example, Anand
(2006: p. 32-33) develops two new arguments against the functionalist CG-theory (which
apply straightforwardly to a fine-grained functionalist theory as well). My diagnoses of these
two different arguments are essentially the same, so I will only discuss one of them here. The
first argument is based on the following case (which I quote):
Context Ralph, John, and Bill all see Ortcutt in the same locales, and all come to the dual
belief that Orcutt is a spy and that he’s not a spy.
24. Each man thinks that Ortcutt is a spy.
25. # No man thinks that Ortcutt is a spy.
28 It might seem that for all I have said De could contain “relaxed” or “disjunctive” ways of thinking about
individuals as well as precise ones, so that “Ortcutt” could be associated with a single element of De even if it is
not associated with a precise way of thinking about this individual. For instance, perhaps there could be a single
element o ∈ De, such that if one comes to believe that Ortcutt is a spy by seeing him at the docks, one believes
the proposition λw. o is-a-spy-at-w, and if one comes to believe that Ortcutt is not a spy by seeing him on TV,
one believes the proposition λw. o is-not-a-spy-at-w. But the existence of such an o is ruled out by the fact that
negation is interpreted classically at all worlds in the model theory. Provided a person has any belief-worlds (and
we may assume that Ortcutt does) they will not believe the proposition λw. x is-a-spy-at-w while also believing
the proposition λw. x is-not-a-spy-at-w for any x in De. Of course we could relax this assumption about negation
in the model theory, but doing so would come at the cost of a significant loss in predictive power.
29 Basic Surrogatism itself allows a similar response to this example: one can hold that names are context-sensitive,
and can denote different elements of De in different contexts. An alternative contextualist theory treats this case
as an example of what Blumberg and Lederman (2020) call “revisionist reports” (for discussion, see Blumberg
and Lederman (2020: §7)). But both of these alternative forms of contextualism also have trouble with the cases I









A functionalist theory (whether Millian or fine-grained) will predict that there are (differ-
ent) contexts in which both 24 and 25 are true. Anand takes this point to be evidence against
the functionalist theory, and ends his argument there. I agree that the example brings out an
important challenge for the functionalist theory, but I think more has to be said about what the
exact challenge is. Consider the following elaboration of Anand’s case:
Context Ralph, John and Bill are three independent investigators working to root out cor-
ruption in the town, who have all come to suspect that Olson, the police chief, is a
spy. One night, while watching over the docks, they all see someone – as it happens,
Ortcutt the mayor – in shady circumstances, and conclude that the person is a spy. But
they all think that the person they saw was Olson; none suspects it was Ortcutt. They
are led to this conclusion in part because they believe that Ortcutt the mayor is in the
clear: he is not a spy. Thus, although each man thinks Olson is a spy, (25) no man
thinks Ortcutt is a spy.30
This story is simply a more detailed version of Anand’s: as in Anand’s case the three men
all know Ortcutt in two different ways; relative to one, they believe he is a spy, and relative
to another they believe he is not. But, while after hearing Anand’s underspecified story it
is most natural to hear 25 as false, after hearing mine it is most natural to hear this same
sentence as true. So the fact that functionalist theories predict that 25 has a true reading is
not on its own evidence against that theory. On the contrary, everyone – whether functionalist
or existentialist – should agree that 25 can used truly to describe Anand’s case. We should
of course hope for a predictive account of how these two ways of telling the story lead us to
understand this sentence in different ways. But everyone needs an account of this kind, not
just the functionalist.
Still, as I have said, Anand’s case does provides evidence against the functionalist theory.
Perhaps the most obvious way for the functionalist to account for the change in context
between 22 and 23 is to say that hearers charitably search for readings of these sentences on
which they are true. But Anand’s example shows that a flat-footed application of this idea
overgenerates: there are true readings of 25, but hearers do not always naturally access them.
So Anand’s case shows that functionalists need a more nuanced story about how 22 and 23 are
both heard as true, which does not also predict that 25 will be heard as true in his case.31
We can now see at last how my example strengthens Anand’s case against the functionalist.
A functionalist might attempt to account for the difference between Quine’s examples and
Anand’s by holding that certain readings are “easier” to access in response to different stories,
30 For some of my consultants the final sentence is improved by deleting “a spy”, adding “yet” before “thinks”, or
changing “no man” to “no investigator”, but all agree that the sentence is true in this setting.
31 It might seem that even simpler arguments could be given against the functionalist position by focusing on “Ralph
does not think that Ortcutt is a spy” (which, unlike 23, i.e. “Ralph thinks Ortcutt is not a spy”, has a negation
over the main verb), but there are good reasons to focus instead, as Anand does, on ascriptions with quantified
subjects. First, “think” tends to exhibit what is often called “neg-raising”, that is, main-clause negations (“does
not think”) are readily interpreted as negating only the complement clause of the verb (“thinks it is not the case
that”). Second, as Anand says, judgments about sentences with main-clause negations are actually very delicate
(see Anand (2006: p. 21), discussing a proposal of Abusch). Even if we control for problems about neg-raising










and that hearers interpret a sentence as true if and only if it has a sufficiently easy to access
true reading. The idea would then be that in the original Ralph story it is sufficiently easy to
access both a true reading of 22 and a true reading of 23, but after hearing Anand’s story it is
sufficiently easy to access a true reading of 24, but not of 25. This blueprint of a story does not
pretend to be explanatory or predictive, but we can set that point aside. The problem is that the
theory still fails to account for my examples. Since 14 and 15 are true in the same relevant
contexts, the functionalist should hold that a true reading of 15 will be just as easy to access
as a true reading of 15 (and similarly for 16 and 17).
More generally: since functionalists predict that 14 and 15 are true in exactly the same
contexts, it is hard to see how they can tell a reasonable story about why one is heard as true,
and the other as false. It is even harder to see how they could tell such a story which would
also predict that 22 and 23 are both heard as true, and that 24 is heard as true and 25 as false
(after Anand’s story). By contrast, the existentialist faces a much less daunting challenge:
they need only to tell a story about why 25 is naturally heard as false after hearing Anand’s
story, and true after hearing mine. It may not be obvious how an existentialist should meet this
challenge, but there is no principled reason to think that it cannot be met.
7.2 Problems with plural subjects
The new theory handles 18 by allowing different sets of permutations to be salient for different
individuals. To see how this works, suppose that there are three relevant elements of De, h,
p and v, corresponding to the names “Hesperus”, “Phosphorus” and “Venus”. In the context
produced by the background story for 18 we may suppose that, relative to Eve and all possible
worlds, p and v are equivalent and h is only equivalent to itself, while relative to Dawn and all
possible worlds, h and v are equivalent and p is only equivalent to itself. In a context where
f (Eve,w) and f (Dawn,w) are the sets of permutations π such that for all x π(x) is equivalent
in these different equivalence relations, 18 will be true. Before Monday at noon, Eve did not
know or believe that Phosphorus was not a star, while Dawn did not know or believe that
Hesperus was not a star. But on Monday at noon, Eve came to know that Phosphorus was a
star, and Dawn came to know that Hesperus was.
Once again it will help to see how this example constrains the official theory by considering
an alternative. A theory is insensitive if it takes the parameter f to be simply a function from
worlds to sets of permutations; it is sensitive if it takes f to be a function from worlds
and individuals to sets of permutations. To illustrate, here is an insensitive lexical entry for
“believe”.
Existentialist Insensitive Believe
JbelieveKg,S, f = λw.λ p.λx. for some π ∈ f (w), ∀w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), p(π) = 1.
Again, I’ve left out complications required to deal with cases where there is not exactly one
permutation variable bound just the verb, since this extra complexity won’t matter here.
Insensitive theories cannot accommodate a true reading of the sentence 18. On such the-
ories f only takes a world argument, so the same set of permutations will be used for each









or one which maps JVenusKg,S, f (w) to JPhosphorusKg,S, f (w), then the proposition expressed
by the complement clause of “learned” will fail condition (i) (from the conditions enumer-
ated in section 5.2): either Eve or Dawn would have known it before. On the other hand,
if the set of permutations contains no permutations which either map JVenusKg,S, f (w) to
JHesperusKg,S, f (w), or no permutations which map JVenusKg,S, f (w) to JPhosphorusKg,S, f (w),
then the proposition expressed by the complement clause of “learned” will fail (ii), at least
one person will not know the relevant proposition on Monday at noon.32
These basic points apply not just to fine-grained theories but to Millian ones as well.
(For the Millian version, take f in the entry above to be a function from worlds to concept-
generators.) In either setting, a sensitive functionalist theory could account for the true reading
of 18 and 19, but not for the contrast between 14 and 15. In either setting, an insensitive
existentialist theory could account for the contrast between 14 and 15 but not for the true
reading of 18 and 19. In this sense, the examples impose independent constraints on both the
CG-theory and my fine-grained one.
7.3 The bound de re
To see how the proposal handles 20, we assume the following syntax (abstracting from







tπ5 t3 is Jupiter s1
and
tπ7 t3 is Mars s1
As observed by Charlow and Sharvit (2014), the key fact is that different permutation
pronouns govern the different occurrences of the variable t3 in this syntax. Recall that in the
setup for this example, John believes that Hesperus is Jupiter and Phosphorus is Mars. The
32 Schiffer’s famous “Madonna problem” (Schiffer 1992: p. 507-8) could be handled by either a sensitive theory, or
by an existentialist one. Dorr’s example goes beyond standard arguments based on Schiffer’s example, by forcing










clause below “λs1” can express the proposition that Hesperus is Jupiter and Phosphorus is
Mars relative to an assignment, if the value of t3 relative to the assignment is the denotation of
“Hesperus”, the value of the first permutation pronoun on this assignment maps the denotation
of “Hesperus” to itself, and the value of the second permutation pronoun on this assignment
maps the denotation of “Hesperus” to the denotation of “Phosphorus”.
More formally, relative to a g,S, f , such that JJupiterKg,S, f is λw. j, while JMarsKg,S, f is
λw.m, and simplifying away the quantification over n, the clause below “John” will evaluate
to:
• λx. there are π1,π2 ∈ f (x,w) such that for all w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), π1(Jt3Kg,S, f )Ew′ j and
π2(Jt3Kg,S, f )Ew′m.33
And this condition can be non-trivially be satisfied, since π1 and π2 can vary independently.
By allowing different permutations to map the same element of De to different elements of
De, the account can deliver an intuitive true reading of the sentence.
Once again considering an alternative class of theories will help to show how the example
constrains the theory. A theory is type-simple if according to it, there is only a single pronoun
for permutations; it is type-variable otherwise. To illustrate, here is one type-simple lexical
entry for “believe”:
Existentialist, Sensitive, Type-Simple Believe
JbelieveKg,S, f = λw.λ p.λx. for some π ∈ f (x,w), ∀w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), p(π) = 1.
Here the quantification over n that appears in the official entry is no longer required: a single
abstraction over permutations is guaranteed to bind any number of occurrences of the single
pronoun for permutations. Type-simple theories allow the verb “believe” always to take an
argument of the same type.
Type-simple theories cannot accommodate a true reading of 20. Since they assume that
there is only one pronoun for permutations, they predict that in the appropriate version of the
syntax displayed above, the same permutation pronoun occurs as sister to both occurrences of
the bound trace t3. Thus the clause below “John” in the syntax displayed above would evaluate
to:
• λx. there is a π ∈ f (x,w) such that for all w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), π(Jt3Kg,S, f )Ew′ j and
π(Jt3Kg,S, f )Ew′m.34
Since John was assumed to know that Jupiter and Mars are distinct, he does not satisfy this
condition: there is no single element of De which stands in Ew′ to Jupiter and to Mars at any
of his belief-worlds w′, never mind at all of them.
Once again, the constraints imposed on our theory by this example are in an important
sense independent of the constraints imposed by the previous two sets of examples. For
33 This assumes also that the world-argument of “believe” has been saturated by a world-pronoun which is not
made explicit above.









example, a functionalist, insensitive type-variable theory could deliver a true reading of 20,
but it would predict neither the contrast between 14 and 15, nor a true reading of 18.
The following table summarizes the ways in which the examples constrain the final theory
(as well as the CG-theory), and exhibits how the constraints they impose are independent
from one another. “F” stands for “functionalist” and “E” for “existentialist”; “I” stands for
“insensitive” and “S” for sensitive; “TS” stands for “Type-simple” and “TV” for “Type-
variable”. “E, S, TS” is thus the official theory (and, in a Millian setting, the CG-theory
itself).
14 vs. 15 (Teachers) 18 (Dorr’s datum) 20 (Bound de re)




















8 The Indexed-Domain CG-theory
At the end of section 2, I noted that there are Millian variants on the CG-theory which can
handle 3-5. In this section, I present such a theory but argue that my fine-grained theory should
be preferred to it.
An acceptable variant on the CG-theory must not only allow an intuitive reading of 5,
but also (given the arguments of the previous section) be existentialist, sensitive, and type-
variable.35 Letting f be a function from individuals to worlds to natural numbers to sets of
concept-generators, the following is a minimal alteration of CG-Believes which satisfies these
desiderata:
Indexed-Domain CG-Believes JbelievesKg, f = λ p.λx.λw. either for all w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w),
p(w′) = 1 or for some n > 1, there are G1 ∈ f (x)(w)(1), ...,Gn ∈ f (x)(w)(n) such that
for all w′ ∈ DOX(x)(w), p(G1)...(Gn)(w′) = 1.36
35 Perhaps the most obvious variant of the CG-theory would be a functionalist one, which allows for an intuitive
true reading of 5 by allowing the concept-generator variables “wrapping” the occurrences of “Hesperus” and
“Phosphorus” to be assigned different values, so that (in effect) these names are associated with different
individual concepts. But as we saw in detail in section 7.1, there are a number of independent reasons to reject
such a functionalist theory.
36 The theories of Ninan (2012) and Rieppel (2017) produce essentially the same results as this entry; it can be
thought as an implementation of their theories using the machinery of the CG-theory. (Ninan sometimes uses
set-notation and speaks of context as supplying “sets” of acquaintance relations, but he uses numerical indices on
the acquaintance relations and in correspondence he confirmed that his intention was to have context supply a










In the CG-theory, f supplies a set of concept-generators as salient relative to each individual;
we might call this theory a single-domain theory. Here, however, since f takes an extra
numerical argument, it in effect supplies a sequence of sets of concept generators. The extra
structure of these “indexed domains” allows the theory to escape the problem with 5. To
see how, consider an f such that f (Plato)(@)(1) contains a single concept-generator which
when applied to Venus produces the individual concept corresponding to “the planet Plato
sees in the evening”, while f (Plato)(@)(2) contains a single concept-generator which when
applied to Venus produces the individual concept corresponding to “the planet Plato sees in
the morning”. Relative to such an f , Indexed-Domain CG-Believes predicts that 5 will be
effectively interpreted as equivalent to “Plato did not believe that the planet Plato saw in the
evening was the planet Plato saw in the morning”, a very good result.
At first sight, the indexed-domain CG-theory might seem to have clear advantages over
my theory. Since it is a Millian theory, it does not require the use of multiple elements of
De corresponding to a single individual, or the machinery of surrogate domain-restrictions.37
These benefits in simplicity come at what might seem the small cost of adding an additional
numerical argument to f , the function which determines which concept-generators are salient
relative to individuals.
But this is in fact a significant cost, which in my view provides a reason to prefer the
fine-grained theory over this Millian one. In section 6 I described how the permutations made
salient relative to each person and world can be thought of as induced by a contextually
supplied relation among ways of thinking about individuals (i.e. elements of De) relative to
each person and world. That sketch is just the beginning of a full story about how background
features of conversational participants’ psychology and surroundings contribute to determining
what permutations are salient relative to an individual and world, but it is at least a beginning.
By contrast it is unclear how the indexed-domain CG-theory can give even the beginning
of such a story. This theory places special weight on the order in which names occur in the
complement clause of an attitude report, and this aspect of the theory leads ultimately to
problems down the road. Suppose that Plato thought the planet he saw in the evening was
brighter than the one he saw in the morning, and consider again the f described above as
delivering an intuitive reading of 5. Relative to this f , the sentence “Plato believed Hesperus
was brighter than Phosphorus” would have an intuitive true reading, roughly paraphrasable
as “Plato thought the planet he saw in the evening was brighter than the one he saw in the
morning”. That is a good result. But relative to this f the sentence “Plato believed Phosphorus
was brighter than Hesperus” would have the very same true reading, and, more generally, on
the indexed-domain CG-theory the first of these sentences will be true in exactly the contexts
where the second is, not a happy prediction.
In response to this problem, one might think that the indexed-domain CG-theory could
appeal to differences in the words used in the complement clauses of these reports to explain
why they are typically interpreted in one way rather than another – by analogy to the strategy
described earlier for how the CG-theory could explain the contrast between 1 and 2. But there
are important differences between those examples and these ones. In explaining the contrast
between 1 and 2 the CG-theorist could appeal to the natural idea that there might be “seen









in the evening” contexts and “seen in the morning” contexts. But this idea does not yield
sufficiently fine-grained f to deliver an intuitive true reading of 5; to do that, we would need
the idea of a “first name is seen in the morning, and second name is seen in the evening”
context. It is hard to understand what kind of context that would be. More generally, there is a
concern that any natural way of saying why a particular fine-grained f is used for one sentence
as opposed to another would be in effect to say that “Hesperus” has a different compositional
semantic value than “Phosphorus”, i.e. to endorse not a fine-grained theory of the f supplied
by context, but a fine-grained theory of the semantics of names.38
This line of thought gives my main reason for concluding that the fine-grained theory is
preferable to the indexed-domain CG-theory. But I would feel more confident in this conclusion
if I had some data which clearly supported it. At present, I don’t have robust, crystal clear
examples of this kind. But I do have some subtle examples which at least have the right
structure to discriminate between the theories, and I will present those examples to illustrate
how such an argument might go:
Context Amalia selects ten subjects who are known all to have genes which differ from one
another’s in a particular part of the genome. She runs two identical samples from
the relevant part of each subject’s genome through a sequencing machine, producing
two printouts for each individual. Amalia’s technician has two pictures of each of the
subjects. To make the data easier to analyze, he is supposed to attach exactly one photo
to every printout, matching the photos of the subjects with printouts of their genetic
sequence. The technician attaches one of the photos of Issa (one of the subjects) to
the correct printout, but he attaches the second photo of Issa to the wrong printout.
Amalia works through the data using the photos as mnemonics for the people. When
she comes across the pair of Issa’s photos, she points at the photos in order and says
to herself “This person shares no relevant genes with that person, so even though
they look similar in the photo, this person is not that one.” Later, the lab manager is
explaining what happened to a friend, and says: “Because I switched the photos...”
26. Amalia thought Issa wasn’t Issa.
27. Amalia didn’t think Issa was Issa.
28. Amalia didn’t know that Issa was Issa.
29. Amalia thought Issa didn’t have any relevant genes in common with Issa.
30. Amalia didn’t think Issa had any relevant genes in common with Issa.
31. Amalia didn’t know that Issa had any relevant genes in common with Issa.39
38 In Goodman and Lederman (forthcoming: §9.1) we develop related objections to a different Millian theory which
delivers a true reading of 5.
39 Same-name cases like these are typically associated with Kripke (1979); this case is more similar to the “Thelma”










Judgments about these sentences are very delicate. But I will report my own judgments
about them, and document how those judgments would bear on our two theories. Nothing I
say is meant to be conclusive.
To my ear, the most acceptable of these six sentences are 26 and 29, the two in which the
negation takes narrow scope over only the complement clause of the attitude verb. The next
most acceptable are 27 and 28, where the negation takes wide scope over the attitude verb,
and the complement clause features the copula. The worst (and indeed flatly unacceptable) for
me are 30 and 31, where the negation is wide-scope over the attitude verb and the complement
clause of the report features an expression which denotes an uncontroversially reflexive
relation.
If these are the facts about these sentences, then they provide evidence for my theory, and
against the indexed-domain CG-theory. Both theories predict true readings of 26 and 29, and
both theories can explain the contrast between 27 and 28 on the one hand and 30 and 31 on the
other, given the hypothesis that the copula’s default use is not to express the reflexive relation
of identity. But only my fine-grained theory gives a properly semantic explanation of the
unacceptability of 30 and 31. It predicts that these sentences have no intuitive true readings,
essentially for the same reason that the original CG-theory predicted that 3-5 have no intuitive
true readings. By contrast, the indexed-domain CG theory predicts that 30 and 31 are on a par
with 3-5, and so in principle both sentences have true readings. Of course, the proponent of
the indexed-domain CG-theory can supplement their theory with a pragmatic principle that
explains why it is hard to access the true readings of 30 and 31, by comparison to 3 and 5. But
if my judgments about these sentences are correct, the fact that the indexed-domain CG-theory
requires this kind of supplementation would be some evidence against it.
Note finally that, although my theory predicts that 30 and 31 are false, it does allow
true readings of more traditional “Paderewski”-style sentences (Kripke (1979)). For instance
suppose that the printout to which Issa’s photo was incorrectly attached showed him as having
Gene G, while the correct printout showed him as having Gene H (and not Gene G), and
consider:
32. Amalia thought Issa had Gene G.
33. Amalia did not think Issa had Gene G.
Both the CG-theory and my theory will (correctly) predict that there is no single context
where both of these sentences are true, but there are (different) contexts in which each of them
receives a natural true reading.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented and argued for a theory which combines a fine-grained theory
of the semantics of names with some key ideas of the CG-theory. Unlike the CG-theory, this
theory straightforwardly allows intuitive true readings of 3-5, without postulating a structural
ambiguity in those sentences. And unlike simpler fine-grained theories, it accommodates a









impossible worlds, but only a highly constrained version of them, so that the models are
comparable to ordinary possible-worlds models in terms of their simplicity and predictive
strength.
A main goal of the paper has been to show how the central examples (3-5; 14-17; 18-19;
20) impose distinct structural constraints on any theory of attitude reports. For concreteness
I have developed this point within a general framework inspired by the CG-theory, where
the constraints can be seen described in terms of the settings of specific parameters within
the theory (Existentialist vs. Functionalist; Sensitive vs. Insensitive; Type-Variable vs. Type-
Simple; Single-domain vs. Indexed-domain). But the examples constrain a wide array of
theories of attitude reports, and I hope my discussion here will spur further exploration of how
they might be accommodated in other frameworks as well.
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